Networking and security

The layer under the servers. Carrier grade NAT done at the kernel rather than patched around, VPN tunnels that survive a NAT rebind, firewall rules somebody can read six months later, and hardening that is measured instead of assumed.

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Defensive work

The large majority of the security work. Hardening, access control, and exposure reduction.

Server hardening

Locking down a production Linux host: key only SSH, no password auth, a firewall with a default deny, least privilege on services, and the logging needed to notice when something is wrong.

Network design

Private clouds, segmentation, and the routing between environments. Built so the rule set is understandable without reading all of it, which is the difference between a firewall that helps and one that gets ignored.

VPN and remote access

Tunnels designed around what breaks them, which is NAT rebinding and idle timeouts rather than encryption. Travel routers configured so staff can reach internal services without opening anything to the internet.

Carrier grade NAT

CGNAT implemented at the kernel networking level on Ubuntu. Implemented at the kernel level, because implementations assembled in userspace fall over under real subscriber load, which is exactly where it matters.

Container and image security

Base image selection, dependency declarations, and the scanning that catches a vulnerable image before it is deployed rather than after.

Vulnerability research

Exploit work in an educational and research context, on lab machines and virtualised targets. This is the part of security with a legal boundary around it, so the context is established before anything is scoped.

02

Work done in this area

CGNAT on Ubuntu
Carrier grade NAT implemented at the kernel networking level rather than assembled in userspace, which is where comparable attempts usually stop working.
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Linux, Ubuntu, UNIX, network administration
Secure Linux server
Production server hardening taken as a security engagement. The client recommended the work without qualification and said they would hire again.
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Linux, computer security, internet security, network security
Hetzner private cloud network
Virtual private cloud built with Terraform, including public access to the clusters through a load balancer. The network defined in code rather than by console clicks.
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Terraform, Hetzner, load balancing, VPN
GL.iNet VPN for telecommuting staff
VPN tunnel configured on a travel router so staff could reach internal services from home. Described by the client as very good and very patient work.
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OpenVPN, WireGuard, GL.iNet, VPN
Docker image hardening
Docker Compose files produced for an Azure deployment with hardened images and open source dependencies declared explicitly, so the build was reproducible.
Stack
Docker, Azure, Kubernetes, Terraform
Pipeline build and image scanning
A pipeline that pushed and then scanned its image, fixed so the scan runs in the right order and its result gates what gets deployed.
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CI, Docker, image scanning
CVE exploitation research
Exploitation work carried out for study and academic research, on virtualised targets and within a lab. Client reported the work as excellent, continued, and fast.
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CVE research, virtual machines, UNIX, web security
Educational exploitation with VMs
A second research engagement building on the first, again inside virtual machines rather than on anything live.
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Virtual machines, computer security, research
OpenStack network and instance
Virtual machine created at STACKIT OpenStack from a bootable ISO, with the network side configured and reachability verified.
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OpenStack, network administration, Linux
Load balancing
Traffic distribution across services, set up so a failing backend drops out rather than taking the service with it.
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Linux, networking, Nginx
SSH access on a closed image
Root access and SSH configured on a Linux image shipped without one, across several distributions with different defaults.
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Linux, Debian, Red Hat, Fedora, shell
OpenWrt router security
Consumer router configured with reservations and a firewall that does not expose the administration interface to the internet.
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OpenWrt, TP-Link, network administration
03

Questions

What does a security engagement involve?

Usually starting with what is exposed and who can reach it, then closing the paths that do not need to be open. After that, access control and logging, so an intrusion attempt leaves a record. It ends with a list of what was changed and why, because a hardening pass nobody understands gets undone within a year.

Do you do penetration testing?

Some of it, in the right context. My exploitation work has been in education and research, on lab machines and virtualised targets. For anything touching a live system, the authorisation has to be explicit and written before any work starts, and I will ask for it up front rather than after the first scan.

Will you recommend a VPN or a firewall product?

I will recommend what fits the problem, which is often something you already own configured properly. A great firewall nobody understands provides less protection than a simple one that is maintained, and the same is true of VPN protocols. I would rather fix the design than add a product.

Can you help after an incident?

Yes. Keeping a compromised system running to watch it is usually the wrong call, and working out what happened is easier on a system that was built to produce logs. Get in touch and say what you are seeing.

Do you handle the networking as well as the servers?

Yes, and doing both halves together is the point. A well built server behind a broken network design still looks broken to the person waiting on it. See Linux and systems for the host side of the same work.